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THE EFFECTS OF MEDICARE PAYMENT
CHANGES ON NURSING HOME STAFFING
DAIFENG HE
PETER MCHENRY
JENNIFER M. MELLOR

ABSTRACT
In light of persistent shortcomings in nursing home care quality and evidence that lower
nurse stafﬁng levels could be harmful to residents, we examine whether stafﬁng levels are
affected by changes in Medicare reimbursement rates. We exploit a 2006 change in Medicare’s methodology for adjusting provider payments for geographic differences in costs, a
change that generated plausibly exogenous variation in nursing facility reimbursement
rates. Our method compares facilities with higher and lower shares of Medicare resident
days, which were differentially exposed to the payment changes we examine. Using panel
data on US nursing homes from 2003 through 2009, we ﬁnd that higher Medicare payments increased nurse stafﬁng hours per resident day. Additional results suggest that
changes in Medicare payments did not affect other measures of quality.
K E Y W O R D S : Medicare payment reform, nursing home stafﬁng, skilled nursing facility
prospective payment system, hospital wage index, geographic realignment
J E L C L A S S I F I C A T I O N : H5, I11, I13, I18

I. Introduction
The quality of nursing home care in the United States has been a long-standing concern, as
evidenced by numerous academic studies and government reports (e.g., Institute of Medicine 1986, 1996; Mor et al. 2009). In the past 20 years, for example, the US Government
Accountability Ofﬁce has issued more than 20 reports on shortcomings in either nursing
home care or the government oversight of nursing homes (US Government Accountability
Ofﬁce 2018). A 2014 report, for example, ﬁnds that one-third of short-stay nursing facility
residents experience adverse events or harms such as medication errors, delays in receiving
necessary care, and dehydration, and that half of these events are preventable (US Department of Health and Human Services Ofﬁce of Inspector General 2014). Nursing home
quality is especially important in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which together
ﬁnance nearly 60 percent of US spending on nursing facility care, for a total of $87.9 billion
in 2017 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2018a). One important dimension of
nursing facility quality is the level of nursing staff, and a large body of research shows that
higher nursing staff levels are associated with reduced cases of infection, dehydration,
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weight loss, and pressure sores; lower mortality; and improvements in physical functioning (e.g., Bostick et al. 2006; Castle 2008; and Delleﬁeld et al. 2015). Additionally, research
using instrumental variables methods ﬁnds that nursing staff levels have a causal effect on
other measures of facility quality (Lin 2014).
While nursing staff levels can be directly impacted by regulations such as minimum
stafﬁng requirements, they may also be indirectly impacted by administratively set reimbursement rates in public insurance programs. However, identifying the causal effect of
Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement on nurse stafﬁng is a challenge. In the Medicaid program, where reimbursement rates are set by states, rate increases may be a response to increased minimum stafﬁng requirements or higher facility stafﬁng costs. A similar concern
pertains to studies examining Medicare payment rates, since differences in Medicare payment rates across areas reﬂect differences in operating costs (i.e., local area wage differences),
which themselves affect stafﬁng levels. Some studies have examined changes in stafﬁng
following Medicare’s adoption of a prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing
facilities (SNFs) in 1998 (e.g., Konetzka et al. 2004), but the SNF PPS changed the payment
methodology, not just the payment levels, making it hard to identify the effect of reimbursement rates on stafﬁng.
Our study adds to this literature by using a novel strategy to identify the causal effects of
facility-speciﬁc Medicare payment changes on nursing home stafﬁng. Speciﬁcally, we examine a one-time plausibly exogenous change in the hospital wage index (HWI), an arealevel adjustment to SNF payments. Prior to ﬁscal year 2006, SNF payments were adjusted
by a hospital wage index deﬁned for local areas using metropolitan statistical areas or
MSAs; from October 2005 on, the wage index was deﬁned for areas using core-based statistical areas or CBSAs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2016; Medicare Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2007). As
a result, the HWI changed for more than 8,500 nursing facilities nationwide; for 8 percent
of facilities, those changes exceeded 3 percentage points. The HWI changes translated to
increases or decreases in the per diem Medicare SNF payment rates, and, unlike most other
year-to-year changes in the HWI, they provide an important source of payment variation
that is unrelated to facility decisions or market factors. We use this quasi-experiment to
examine the causal effects of Medicare payment changes on registered nurse (RN) hours
per resident day, licensed practical nurse (LPN) hours per resident day, and total direct
care staff hours per resident day. Our methodology also compares facilities with higher
and lower shares of Medicare resident days, which were differentially exposed to the payment adjustments.
We ﬁnd that increases in Medicare payments increased stafﬁng hours per resident day
at facilities. In particular, a 5 percent increase in Medicare payments increased RN hours
per resident day by 9.01 percent (and LPN hours per resident day by 3.24 percent) in facilities with 10 percent of resident days paid by Medicare relative to facilities with no Medicare patients. We ﬁnd no evidence that changes in Medicare payments affected other measurable dimensions of nursing home quality. Our ﬁndings are important given long-standing
concerns about nursing home quality and the more recent attention on stafﬁng deﬁciencies
in particular. Moreover, our ﬁndings have implications for policies that changed real Medicare payments to nursing facilities as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as well as
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for payment policy recommendations from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC).

II. Background and Literature Review
Both Medicare and Medicaid pay for a signiﬁcant share of all nursing home care. According to 2016 data, Medicaid covers the cost for 62 percent of all nursing home residents
while Medicare is the primary payer for another 14 percent (Kaiser Family Foundation,
n.d.). Medicare covers short-term SNF stays following Part A covered inpatient hospitalizations of three days or more; residents covered by Medicare receive skilled nursing services, which are services ordered by physicians and provided by RNs, LPNs, or physical
therapists. Medicaid typically covers longer-term stays for residents needing custodial care
and assistance with activities of daily living, such as dressing, bathing, and toileting. Medicaid reimbursement policies are determined by individual states subject to federal rules.
Medicare reimbursement follows federal guidelines under the SNF PPS.
Only a few prior studies have examined the effects of Medicare payment changes on
nursing home stafﬁng.1 Using data from 1996 to 2000, Konetzka et al. (2004) report that
the introduction of the SNF PPS in 1998 had negative effects on the sum of RN and LPN
hours. However, the SNF PPS had differing impacts on facility payments, with some facilities experiencing increases in payments and others experiencing decreases (White 2005).
White (2005) uses simulated facility-speciﬁc payment changes to disentangle the effects of
changes in payment levels, and reports that payment increases raised direct care stafﬁng.
However, the primary source of variation in the simulated payments is year-by-year revisions in the HWI routinely implemented by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to reﬂect ﬂuctuations of local labor market conditions (i.e., average wages),
which are likely to be correlated with facilities’ supply decisions. Hence, the payment
changes in White (2005) are potentially related to nurse stafﬁng through local labor market
channels like the ease of recruiting nurses, in addition to the direct payment channel. Related to these prior works, Kaestner and Guardado (2008) study hospital nurse stafﬁng levels in response to hospital geographic reclassiﬁcations that increase the HWI and thus the
Medicare payment rate. In contrast to the nursing facility studies, they ﬁnd that higher
Medicare payments reduced nursing staff levels at hospitals.
A number of other studies have examined the impact of Medicaid payment rates on
nursing home stafﬁng using various study designs. Some longitudinal studies using state
ﬁxed-effects models ﬁnd that increases in Medicaid payments are associated with higher
stafﬁng (Grabowski et al. 2004; Feng et al. 2008). Because changes in state payment rates
may be a response to higher facility costs or part of cost-containment efforts, other studies
have employed instrumental variables methods to deal with endogeneity of this type. Harrington, Swan, and Carrillo (2007) use such an approach in a national sample of facilities
from 2002, and ﬁnd that increases in state Medicaid payments increase RN hours.
1 In addition, Zinn et al. (2008) examine the effect of Medicare PPS on administrative nurse stafﬁng, or
time spent by nurses in activities other that direct care giving, in the nursing home setting. That study ﬁnds
that the introduction of Medicare PPS increased administrative nurse stafﬁng.
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Hackmann (2019) uses exogenous variation in Medicaid reimbursement rates across
Pennsylvania nursing homes in 2000–02 and ﬁnds that a 10 percent increase in Medicaid
rates increases skilled nurse stafﬁng per resident by 8.7 percent.
In summary, prior studies on Medicare payment rate changes ﬁnd opposite-signed effects on stafﬁng in hospitals and nursing homes. The literature on Medicaid payment and
stafﬁng generally ﬁnds that higher payments increase stafﬁng, but these studies vary considerably in terms of identiﬁcation strategies, and the most recent work in this area uses a
single-state setting. Our study uses national data from a more recent time period to examine the effect of Medicare payment changes on nursing facility stafﬁng. Our key contribution is the use of an improved strategy for identifying the causal effects of Medicare payment changes on facility stafﬁng, as we describe in the next section.

III. Nursing Facility Price Shocks
A . ME D IC A R E P A Y ME N T TO N UR S I N G F A CI L I T I E S

For patients enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare, Medicare reimburses facilities according
to the SNF PPS, which was introduced in 1998 and replaced the prior cost-based system of
payment. Under the PPS, facility payments from Medicare are determined by daily base
rates deﬁned separately for urban and rural facilities and are updated annually based on
nationwide inﬂation. Starting in 2012 and under the ACA, the annual updates to the base
payments are reduced to account for economy-wide productivity increases; these “productivity adjustment factors” in Medicare payment systems are the source of substantial savings in the ACA (Capretta and Antos 2015).
To account for differences in labor costs across the United States, a portion of the base
rate is adjusted by the hospital wage index (HWI) in the area in which the facility is located
(MedPAC 2018). In 2006, which is the midpoint of our sample period, 76 percent of the
base rate was adjusted by the HWI (Medicare Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2006). Figure 1 shows the relationship between
the per diem SNF payment and the HWI, and equation 1 expresses it algebraically:
PPS 5 HWI # 0:76 # bU ðrÞ 1 0:24 # bU ðr Þ

(1),

where bU (r) represents the base payment adjusted for the case mix of the patient; this base
payment differs by the urban/rural status of the SNF.2
The HWI is calculated by CMS as the ratio of the area’s average hourly hospital wage to
the national average hourly hospital wage, where average hourly wages are derived from
2 The base payment is adjusted for case mix using resource utilization groups (RUGs). In 2019, there were
66 different RUGs, which reﬂect the varying resources needed to treat patients with different therapy and
nursing needs, medical conditions, and cognitive and physical functioning (MedPAC 2018). Effective October 2019, CMS will use a new case mix system called PDPM or Patient-Driven Payment Model (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services 2018b). Effective October 2018, CMS adopted the SNF Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, which adds bonuses or subtracts penalties based on each facility’s 30-day all-cause
hospital readmission rate (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2018c).
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of the relationship between the HWI and the Medicare
SNF PPS payment. Source: Adapted from MedPAC (2018).
data on wages, salaries, beneﬁts, and hours reported by short-term acute care hospitals
paid under the inpatient PPS on their annual Cost Reports (MaCurdy et al. 2009). Thus,
facilities located in areas where hospital wages exceed the national average have wage index
values greater than 1, and their payments are adjusted upward; facilities located in relatively low-cost areas have HWI values below 1 and receive lower payments.
B . GEOGR APHIC REA LIG N MENT

Since the HWI is an area-level adjustment, CMS must also establish how geographic areas
are deﬁned. Prior to federal ﬁscal year (FY) 2006, CMS deﬁned the areas using metropolitan statistical areas; that is, the wage index value was based on costs in the MSA, and all
facilities in the same MSA had the same HWI value applied to their payment determinations. Then, starting with federal FY 2007 (on October 1, 2006), CMS used core-based statistical areas in deﬁning and applying HWI adjustments. During the transitional year of FY
2006 (between October 1, 2005, and September 30, 2006), CMS used a blended HWI adjustment equal to the average of MSA-based and CBSA-based wage index values (Medicare
Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2007).
Under both MSA and CBSA geographies, regions outside of a metropolitan/urban area
are grouped into one of 50 “rest-of-state” areas (i.e., one for each state).
The switch from MSAs to CBSAs had two effects on Medicare payments to facilities.
First, because it altered the composition of the areas, the geographic realignment changed
the value of the area-level HWI applied to facility per diem payment rates for thousands of
facilities. For example, numerous facilities inside relatively low-wage MSAs (with relatively
low HWIs) instead became part of higher-wage CBSAs, leading to increases in the HWI,
while many other facilities in relatively high-wage MSAs become part of lower-wage
CBSAs (leading to decreases in HWI). Figure 2 shows these HWI changes at the county
level; for each county, the map displays the change in HWI following the switch from
MSAs to CBSAs in the wage index calculation. Geographic regions across the United States
experienced both increases and decreases of varying magnitudes. Second, the switch from
415

FIGURE 2. Changes in HWI under MSA and CBSA deﬁnitions, by county. Source: Authors’ calculations using published values from
the Federal Register (Medicare Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2005a). A color
version of this ﬁgure is available online.
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MSAs to CBSAs affected base rates for a small group of facilities. In some cases, facilities
previously designated as rural were designated as urban (and vice versa); since base payments are different for rural facilities and urban facilities, base payments either fell or rose
in such instances.
Our identiﬁcation strategy focuses on the ﬁrst component of the Medicare payment
change—the change in the HWI for individual SNFs resulting solely from the geographic
realignment. In doing so, we exclude the small group of facilities for which the urban/rural
designation switched (813 facilities). The reason for this exclusion is that under the geographic realignment when a facility switched from rural to urban designation (or vice versa),
both the base payment and the HWI changed. Base payments differ by resource utilization
group, so information on the RUG distribution at the facility level would be necessary to
calculate payment changes for facilities that switch between urban and rural designation.
Since the facility-speciﬁc RUG distribution is not easy to measure and the switchers account for a small number of facilities, we focus on the vast majority of facilities whose rural/urban classiﬁcation remained unchanged. Importantly, these changes in the HWI led to
changes in Medicare facility payments that were independent from the choices made by
facilities and from the market conditions that facilities face. Equation 2 deﬁnes the change
in the SNF PPS per diem rate relative to the initial rate (referred to as the “payment change”
for simplicity). Substituting equation 1 for PPS and simplifying, we can express the percentage payment change as a function of the percentage point change in HWI:
DPayment 5

PPS1 2 PPS0
0:76DHWI
5
0:76HWI 0 1 ð1 2 0:76Þ
PPS0

(2).

For example, a facility whose HWI increased from 1.1 to 1.15 saw a 3.53 percent rise in the
per diem payment rate, while a facility whose HWI fell from 0.95 to 0.90 saw a 3.95 percent
drop in the per diem rate (all else equal). Our identiﬁcation strategy is similar to that of
Clemens and Gottlieb (2014), in that we use this geographic change in the application
of the wage index to examine provider responses to Medicare payment changes.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects that the geographic realignment had on the HWI values
for the nursing facilities in our sample. Each point represents a speciﬁc facility. The horizontal axis shows each facility’s 2006 HWI when the MSA is used to assign the facility to
a market; the vertical axis shows the facility’s 2006 HWI when the CBSA is used. Points off
of the 45-degree line indicate changes in HWI values generated by the geographic realignment, and thereby policy-induced changes in payment rates. Facilities across the whole
range of MSA-based HWI values experienced changes in the HWI, and those changes included both increases and decreases. Using equation 2, we calculate the percentage change
in Medicare payment associated with the HWI change; the distribution of Medicare payment changes is reported in Table 1. Nearly two-thirds of facilities experienced changes
due to the policy, and some changes were quite large: 275 or 2.1 percent of nursing facilities
saw payment increases or decreases of more than 5 percent. Another 5.5 percent of facilities experienced increases or decreases of more than 3 percent, and nearly 11 percent experienced increases or decreases ranging from 1 percent to 3 percent. These changes,
though appearing small in magnitude, are important for facility proﬁt margins. MedPAC
(2017) estimated the average SNF proﬁt margin to be 1.6 percent in 2015.
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FIGURE 3. HWI under MSA and CBSA deﬁnitions. The ﬁgure shows the
relationship between the MSA-based HWI and the CBSA-based HWI in 2006
for 13,023 nursing facilities. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.

TABLE 1. Geography-induced change in 2006 Medicare payment
Change in Medicare payment
Decreases
DPayment less than 20.05
DPayment in [20.05, 20.03)
DPayment in [20.03, 20.01)

No. of nursing facilities

Share of nursing facilities

140

1.1

326

2.5

874

6.6

3,735

28.3

4,631

35.1

2,688

20.4

DPayment in (0.01, 0.03]

553

4.2

DPayment in (0.03, 0.05]

121

0.9

DPayment in [20.01, 0)
No change

Increases
DPayment in (0, 0.01]

DPayment greater than 0.05
Total facilities

135

1

13,203

100

Note: Sample excludes government-owned and in-hospital nursing facilities and facilities with
missing data for RN hours per resident day and explanatory variables in the regressions.
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The switch from MSAs to CBSAs had differing effects on facilities located in urban and
rural areas, even those that did not switch from one designation to the other. For example,
some large MSAs got split into multiple CBSAs, and the most-urban of the new CBSAs saw
the highest HWI increases. We tested this systemically by regressing the 2006 county-level
HWI difference (the CBSA-based HWI minus the MSA-based HWI) on the county share
of the population living in urban areas, controlling for state ﬁxed effects; the coefﬁcient
estimate for county urban share was positive and signiﬁcant. Therefore, to address the
possibility of differential trends across urban and rural areas that could contribute to differences in stafﬁng, we control for time-varying urban-rural differences in our model, as
we note below. Our estimates also account for persistent location differences with facilitylevel ﬁxed effects.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the ﬁrst to exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in the HWI caused by Medicare’s shift from MSAs to CBSAs to study
the effects of Medicare payment on nursing home stafﬁng. A few studies have examined
the effects of the HWI geography change on other health-care provider decisions. McHenry and Mellor (2018) use the same geographic change to test whether hospitals strategically game the wage index adjustment by paying higher wages to nurses. Shin (2019)
and He et al. (2020) use similar geographic realignments to examine the impacts of Medicare payment changes on the volume of care provided to Medicare patients by hospitals
and SNFs, respectively.3

IV. Conceptual Framework
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework for understanding the effects of
Medicare payment changes on SNF stafﬁng decisions. Following Sloan (2000), we assume
that the facility maximizes the weighted sum of proﬁts and quality of care. Revenue is derived from two types of services, post-acute care (PA) and long-stay care (LS), the prices
of which ( p) may differ. We assume that facilities take output prices as given, and that
the price of post-acute care is determined by Medicare reimbursement policy. Output

3 The nursing home setting offers a cleaner identiﬁcation strategy compared with the hospital setting.
Hospitals can circumvent changes in the HWI that would otherwise reduce their payments by seeking geographic reclassiﬁcation to a different area with a higher HWI. Additionally, hospitals can also receive a number of adjustments to the HWI. The rural ﬂoor provision holds that hospitals in urban areas within a state
cannot be assigned an HWI lower than the HWI used in rural areas. Under the out-migration adjustment,
CMS adjusts the wage index applied to hospital payments based on commuting patterns of hospital employees. The occupational mix adjustment adjusts the index based on the mix of hospital employees. Estimates
suggest that almost 40 percent of hospitals paid under the inpatient prospective payment system receive
some kind of adjustment or reclassiﬁcation so that the wage index applied to payment calculations is different from the index of their geographic location (Institute of Medicine 2012). In contrast, federal regulations
do not allow administrative adjustments to the HWI in the case of nursing facility payment, thus strengthening our ability to identify causal effects of payment changes (Medicare Prospective Payment System and
Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2005a, 2005b, 2007).
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quantities are q and the level of stafﬁng (i.e., labor input) is L.4 Wages are w and are taken as
determined in a competitive labor market. Quality of care is n, which rises with stafﬁng.
The nursing home maximizes its institutional utility (with the weight on proﬁts denoted by a):
max a½ pPA qPA ðLÞ 1 pLS qLS ðLÞ 2 wL 1 ð1 2 aÞnðLÞ
L

The ﬁrst-order necessary condition is the following:


∂qPA
∂qLS
∂n
50
1 pLS
2 w 1 ð1 2 aÞ
a pPA
∂L
∂L
∂L

(3).

(4).

An increase in stafﬁng increases output quantity and thereby increases proﬁt, but that
comes at a marginal cost of higher payroll. An increase in stafﬁng also increases quality.
The facility chooses the optimal level of stafﬁng to balance weighted marginal costs and
beneﬁts.
Our empirical analysis estimates the effect of a Medicare reimbursement rate change
on stafﬁng. In the framework above, an increase in pPA increases the marginal beneﬁt of
post-acute services, which increases the marginal revenue product of stafﬁng. The facility
would likely respond by increasing its stafﬁng level. Conversely, a decrease in the reimbursement rate would decrease the marginal revenue product of stafﬁng inputs and might
decrease the stafﬁng level. However, it is possible that the facility independently values
quality of care enough to mitigate any reduction in stafﬁng from reimbursement cuts. The
model incorporates such a mitigation with the possibility that the weight on proﬁts (a)
is small, or the effect of stafﬁng on quality of care ∂n=∂L is large.
Facilities vary in the share of total services provided to post-acute patients reimbursed
by Medicare. Our conceptual framework implies that if marginal labor inputs are used less
for post-acute than for long-stay patients, then the marginal product of labor for postacute services will be smaller than that for long-stay services (∂qPA =∂L < ∂qLS =∂L). In such
a case, the inﬂuence of Medicare reimbursement on stafﬁng will be smaller. But for facilities with a larger Medicare share, the inﬂuence of Medicare reimbursement changes on
stafﬁng will be larger. This observation informs our identiﬁcation strategy that compares
plausibly exogenous changes in Medicare reimbursement rates across facilities with higher
versus lower Medicare shares.

V. Estimation
To estimate the effects of Medicare SNF payment changes on nursing staff levels, we estimate equation 5:
yit 5 a1 DPayment i # POST t # Medicare Sharei 1 a2 DPayment i # POST t
1 a3 POST t # Medicare Sharei 1 b1 Xit 1 gi 1 tt 1 lst 1 εit

ð5Þ,
(5),

4 In this conceptual framework, we assume that labor inputs are used interchangeably for post-acute and
long-stay care, rather than specializing in either type of care. This is consistent with the measures of facilitylevel stafﬁng available to us.
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where i denotes the facility and t denotes the time period. Our sample includes three years
prior to the FY 2006 change in the construction of the HWI (2003–05) and three years after
the change (2007–09), and we omit 2006, where an average of MSA-based HWI and
CBSA-based HWI was used. Our sample period ends in 2009 so that the implementation
of the ACA does not confound our analysis. The dependent variable, yit, is one of several
stafﬁng measures, including RN hours per resident day (HPRD), LPN HPRD, and total
direct care staff HPRD. We deﬁne these in more detail in Section VI.
The key explanatory variable in the regression is the interaction of DPaymenti, POSTt,
and Medicare Sharei. DPaymenti is the percentage change in per diem Medicare payment
rates to SNF caused by the change in HWI, and calculated with equation 2. POSTt is a
binary variable indicating years after the realignment (2007–09).5 Medicare Sharei is the
facility-speciﬁc share of Medicare days, or the ratio of resident days paid by Medicare to
total resident days, deﬁned for 2005, the calendar year prior to the geographic change.
The average Medicare share in our sample is 14.5 percent in 2005. This variable measures
the “exposure” of a facility to the Medicare payment change, as facilities with an initially
higher Medicare share are more heavily affected by Medicare payment changes than facilities with an initially lower Medicare share.6 Thus, the estimate of a1 measures the difference in the effect of the payment change by facilities’ exposure to Medicare.7
We include a large number of controls in the model. Xit represents a set of time-varying
facility and county traits. Time-varying facility traits include the number of certiﬁed beds
and indicator variables for whether the facility is part of a chain or is a nonproﬁt. Timevarying county traits include nursing home beds per 1,000 residents age 65 and older,
home health agencies per 1,000 residents age 65 and older, shares of the county population

5 CMS uses the ﬁscal year and most of our other data sources are based on the calendar year (CY). Although a given ﬁscal year runs from October 1 of the past calendar year through September 31 of the current
calendar year, we do not think this misalignment poses a serious threat to our identiﬁcation, as most of the
CY and FY overlap.
6 At the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we used a measure of Medicare revenue in the construction
of our key explanatory variable in equation 5, in place of the change in the Medicare payment rate interacted
with the Medicare share. This change facilitates the interpretation of the coefﬁcient estimates. We estimated
these models and obtained results (available upon request) that are consistent with the main estimates from
equation 5. However, because the construction of facility-level Medicare revenue relies on a strong simplifying assumption, we report results from using the triple interaction term in equation 5 as our main explanatory variable. Speciﬁcally, to construct facility-level Medicare per diem rates we need data on the facility’s
case mix of Medicare patients, among other measures. We are unable to measure the case mix of Medicare
patients in our data, so we used the facility-level average RUG as a proxy. This assumes that the facility-level
average RUG for all patients (short-stay Medicare patients and long-stay patients) is the same as the average
RUG for Medicare patients.
7 Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on changes in HWI at the geographic level. While facilities in the same
location experienced a similar policy change, our strategy of measuring the facility’s exposure to the policy
change by its Medicare share allows us to exploit within-location variation in the policy change as well, since
nearby facilities with different Medicare shares were affected differentially by the policy. We conﬁrmed in
our sample that a substantial share of the variation in our main independent variable occurs within geographic areas deﬁned by hospital service areas (HSAs).
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that are female, African American, Hispanic, under age 65, and in poverty, the Medicare
Advantage penetration rate, and the employment-to-population ratio. In addition, Xit also
includes interactions between each of the year dummies and a measure of the share of the
county population residing in areas designated as urban. This allows for differential urbanrural trends, since, as noted earlier, the impacts of the HWI geographic realignment had
differing effects on facilities located in urban and rural areas. To capture all time-invariant
factors at the facility level, such as geographic location and management style, we include
gi, a set of facility ﬁxed effects. We include a set of year dummies (represented by tt) to pick
up annual changes in stafﬁng affecting all facilities nationwide. lst represents a full set of
state-by-year dummy variables, which capture all factors that change at an annual level
and affect all nursing facilities in the same state the same way, such as state-speciﬁc macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, demographic trends, and policy changes. εit is the error term.
We estimate the model for Medicare/Medicaid certiﬁed nursing homes across the
United States.8 We exclude in-hospital facilities and government-owned facilities from
our sample since these facilities may differ in important ways from the rest of the market.9
As noted above, we also exclude 813 facilities whose designation as urban or rural switched
as a result of the geographic realignment. Those facilities experienced base rate shifts (between the rural- and urban-speciﬁc base rates) in addition to the HWI change. We weight
observations in the regressions by the number of Medicare/Medicaid certiﬁed beds. We
cluster the standard errors at the level of the unique MSA-CBSA pairs in our sample.

VI. Data
Our primary data source is LTCFocus.org.10 For the stafﬁng measures we use, LTCFocus
draws from the Online Survey Certiﬁcation and Reporting (OSCAR)/Certiﬁcation and
Survey Provider Enhanced Reporting (CASPER) data. OSCAR/CASPER data are collected
by state agencies as part of annual certiﬁcation inspections of nursing homes and are maintained by CMS. We include three measures of stafﬁng, each deﬁned as hours per resident
day (HPRD): RN HPRD, LPN HPRD, and total direct care staff (DC) HPRD. DC staff
hours are deﬁned as the sum of RN, LPN, and certiﬁed nursing assistant (CNA) hours.11

8 Because they are not included in LTCFocus.org, our main data source, facilities in Alaska and Washington, DC, are excluded.
9 For example, because of the close connection between hospital-based nursing homes and the hospitals
where the home is located, the former may consider both hospital and facility objectives, which will affect
responses to Medicare payment changes. The literature has often treated the freestanding nursing facilities
separately from the hospital-based nursing facilities (e.g., Konetzka et al. 2006; White 2005). Of all facilities in
2005, 6 percent were government owned and 9 percent were in-hospital facilities.
10 LTCFocus.org is produced by the Shaping Long-Term Care in America Project at Brown University,
funded in part by the National Institute on Aging (1P01AG027296).
11 In constructing these measures, LTCFocus converts CMS versions of the survey responses of facilities
into measures of the number of RN (or LPN or CNA) HPRD. In the process LTCFocus inspects the data for
implausible values and sets these variables to missing in certain cases, and imputes values for certain cases
when the facility’s data exhibit sizable variations from one year to the next (speciﬁcally when the stafﬁng is
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We calculated the HWI change used to identify the payment changes from published
data in the Federal Register (Medicare Prospective Payment System and Consolidated
Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2007). These data provide each county’s MSA assignment, CBSA assignment, 2006 MSA-based wage index, and 2006 CBSA-based wage index.
DHWIi is deﬁned as the 2006 CBSA-based HWI minus the 2006 MSA-based wage index,
and is used in equation 2 to calculate DPaymenti. We then merged these county-level data
to facilities in LTCFocus by county code.12
For the facility’s Medicare share in 2005, we used a variable from LTCFocus measuring
the share of SNF Medicare days out of the total number of nursing home days for all residents in the facility in the calendar year. This variable was obtained from the Residential
History File (RHF), which is constructed from Medicare enrollment and claims data and
the Minimum Data Set (MDS). Additional details on construction of the RHF are available
in Intrator et al. (2010).
We obtain facility-level data on ownership type, membership in a chain, and bed size
from annual Nursing Home Compare data.13 We extract county-level data on demographic and economic characteristics of the population, as well as hospital beds and home
health agencies per 1,000 residents age 65 and older from the Area Health Resource File
(AHRF). We obtain county-year data on the Medicare managed care organization penetration rate from LTCFocus, which includes AHRF data originally from CMS. We construct annual measures of county employment-to-population ratios from US Census Bureau data, namely, County Business Patterns data on the number of employees per county
and intercensal estimates of the county population. We obtain data on the county’s urban
share in 2000 from the US Census Bureau and data on the county’s metro status from
Mable/Geocorr 2000.
In additional analysis, we examine several other quality measures and a measure of resident days. The ﬁrst two quality measures are counts of life safety deﬁciencies and health
less than one-third or more than three times the median of previous years). Documentation from LTCFocus
(Datadictionary.xlsx, row 235) speciﬁcally notes: “Facilities report the number of Registered Nurse (RN)
hours during the two weeks prior to their annual survey. CMS converts the number of hours into full-time
equivalents (based on a 35-hour work week) and this is what is reported on the annual OSCAR or CASPER
data. We convert the FTEs back into hours, by multiplying by 35, and divide the total number of RN hours
by the number of residents in the facility (also drawn from the OSCAR or CASPER) to arrive at the RN hours
per resident day (HPRD). We also clean this variable when the FTEs reported are implausible. We set to
missing when total FTEs are 995 or higher or if there are more RN and LPNs reported than the number
of beds in a facility. We also verify stafﬁng variables based on a facility’s data from previous years and impute
based on previous data if stafﬁng levels are less than 1/3 the median of previous years or greater than 3 times
the median, for example. For county and state this is the average RN HPRD among all facilities.”
12 Given the importance of having accurate measures of facility-speciﬁc changes and the county-level nature of these data, we validated the county code in LTCFocus against two other sources of nursing facility
data with county codes: CMS Skilled Nursing Facility Cost Reports and Nursing Home Compare. For most
facilities, the three sources listed the same county. For cases where discrepancies existed across the three
sources, we conducted manual lookups of street addresses to obtain the correct county.
13 In cases in which Nursing Home Compare data were missing, we used the LTCFocus data to ﬁll in the
missing values.
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deﬁciencies, respectively.14 We obtain these variables from the Nursing Home Compare
Calendar Year Provider Standard Surveys and Deﬁciency Files from CMS, which are based
on monthly extracts of the OSCAR database. Since the unit of analysis in each calendar
year’s data is the survey, not the provider, and surveys can be 9 to 15 months apart, we
construct these variables following the procedures in the Online Appendix;. Following
Konetzka et al. (2004) and White (2005), we also examine several Nursing Home Compare quality measures (QMs): these include three measures of the percentage of residents
with pressure ulcers, deﬁned for high-risk long-stay residents, low-risk long-stay residents,
and short-stay residents, plus the share of long-stay residents who were physically restrained.15,16 We obtain data on resident days from the SNF Cost Reports following the
procedures described in the Online Appendix;.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the roughly 13,000 facilities in our sample in
2005. On average, facilities report 0.31 hours per resident day for RNs, 0.75 hours per resident day for LPNs, and 3.23 hours per resident day for direct care staff. For comparison,
the minimum federally recommended stafﬁng levels by CMS are 0.75, 0.55, and 4.1 hours
for RNs, LPNs, and direct care staff, respectively (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2001).17 The average Medicare share of patient days is 14.5 percent, similar to national statistics. Across all facilities, the average payment change is a decrease of 0.0014
(that is, 0.14 percent) but as noted in Table 1, there is considerable variation across our
sample. In additional columns of Table 2, we compare facilities experiencing payment
decreases of 1 percent or more and those experiencing payment increases of 1 percent
or more to facilities with more modest or zero payment changes (payment changes ranging from 21 percent to 1 percent, including no change). Facilities in all three groups had
similar mean stafﬁng levels in 2005. Facilities with modest payment changes had a lower
Medicare share than those with larger payment changes, but the difference is small
14 Examples of life safety deﬁciencies (also known as “K-tags”) include inspection citations related to ﬁre
alarms, sprinkler systems, utilities and cook facilities, door design related to smoke/ﬁre, and means of egress,
among others. Examples of health deﬁciencies (also known as “F-tags”) include citations related to infection
control, accident environment, food safety, quality of care, and pharmacy consultation, among others.
15 We chose these from 15 QMs that were available in 2005 (and thus before the payment change we examine). Since our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the payment change that took place in 2006, it is not possible for us to use other QMs introduced in that year. We construct annual facility-speciﬁc measures by
averaging quarterly data obtained from CMS. For 2003, we have only two quarters of Nursing Home Compare QM data; in all other years in our panel we have all four quarters of QM data.
16 Additional long-stay quality measures include the percentage of residents (1) whose need for help with
daily activities has improved, (2) who have moderate/severe pain, (3) who lose control of bowels/bladder,
(4) who have/had a catheter inserted and left in their bladder, (5) who spend most time in a bed or chair,
(6) whose locomotion has worsened, (7) who have a urinary tract infection, (8) who are more depressed
or anxious, and (9) who lose too much weight. Two other short-stay quality measures are the percentage
of residents (1) with delirium, and (2) who had moderate to severe pain. We also estimate models of these
11 measures in a robustness check described in the Section VII.
17 These are recommended minimum stafﬁng levels from a 2001 CMS report (cited in Harrington et al.
2016). Various states have implemented legally binding minimum stafﬁng levels (Bowblis 2011); the state
legal minimum levels are not always expressed in terms of hours per resident day.
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(14.4 percent compared with about 15 percent). Across the three groups, there are a number of statistically signiﬁcant differences in other facility traits such as size, chain status,
and ownership, but these differences are generally small. It is important to note that
our identiﬁcation strategy relies on within-facility payment changes induced by the geographic realignment; therefore, all time-invariant facility-speciﬁc traits are controlled for.

VII. Results
A . M A I N S P E CI F I C A T IO N RE S U L T S

Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation 5. In addition to the covariates listed
in the table, the model also includes facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, state-by-year
ﬁxed effects, and a set of interactions between year indicators and the county’s urban share.
The estimated coefﬁcient for the key explanatory variable—interaction of the percentage
payment change, baseline Medicare share, and an indicator for years after the policy
change—is reported in the ﬁrst row. In all three models, the coefﬁcient estimates for the
key explanatory variable are positive, consistent with payment increases leading to higher
staff hours per resident day. The estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in the models of RN
and LPN hours per resident day.
To interpret the effect sizes, we simulate the effects of a 5 percent payment increase for
facilities with a Medicare share of 10 percent relative to 0 percent. This is a relatively large
change—only 2.1 percent of facilities have payment changes larger than 5 percent, and a
10 percentage point change in Medicare share is approximately equal to the median Medicare share and its interquartile range. The simulated effects are reported in Table 3 and
show that this 5 percent payment increase raised RN hours per resident day by 9.01 percent
(and LPN hours per resident day by 3.24 percent) in facilities with 10 percent of resident days
paid by Medicare relative to facilities with no Medicare patients. These effects are similar
to responses by Pennsylvania nursing homes to changes in Medicaid payment rates reported
in prior work. Speciﬁcally, Hackmann (2019) ﬁnds that a 5 percent increase in Medicaid
payments increased skilled nursing staff by 4.35 percent, which lies between our estimates.
Some of the other coefﬁcient estimates reported in Table 3 are statistically signiﬁcant.
Increases in beds are associated with decreases in stafﬁng hours per resident day, perhaps
explained by scale economies. Stafﬁng is signiﬁcantly lower for facilities that are part of a
chain, and stafﬁng decreases as Medicare Advantage penetration increases. The estimated
coefﬁcients for the interaction term between the payment change and POST are small for
the LPN and direct-care speciﬁcations, suggesting that changes in Medicare payments
have near-zero effects at facilities that do not treat Medicare patients. However, a 5 percent
payment increase is estimated to reduce RN HPRD at zero-Medicare facilities by 0.04,
which is about 13 percent of the mean; our conjecture is that the linear Medicare share
term may be somewhat misspeciﬁed in the RN model, although we also note that the conﬁdence interval includes quite small effects at zero-Medicare facilities. The estimated coefﬁcients for the baseline Medicare share interacted with the POST indicator are negative
and signiﬁcant, indicating that higher Medicare share nursing facilities decreased stafﬁng
levels in the post period, even for facilities that did not experience changes in the HWI
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics, nursing facilities in 2005
Facilities with Facilities with Facilities with
large payment small payment large payment
All facilities
decreases
changes
increases
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Stafﬁng variables
RN hours per resident
day (RN HPRD)

LPN hours per resident
day (LPN HPRD)

Direct-care staff hours per
resident day (DC HPRD)

Explanatory variables
Change in Medicare
payment (DPayment)
Medicare share

0.305

0.311

0.303

0.317

[0.371]

[0.274]

[0.387]

[0.278]

12,956

1,300

10,856

800

0.754

0.748

0.757

0.719c

[0.531]

[0.475]

[0.550]

[0.297]

12,952

1,300

10,852

800

3.228

3.304a

3.223

3.168

[0.973]

[1.017]

[0.983]

[0.722]

12,931

1,299

10,833

799

N 5 12,956

N 5 1,300

N 5 10,856

N 5 800

20.0014

20.031a

20.00047

0.034a

0.145

0.149

0.144

0.153b

Facility no. of Medicare/
Medicaid certiﬁed beds

110.320

127.210a

108.200

111.700c

Facility is part of a chain

0.563

0.515a

0.574

0.493a

Facility is nonproﬁt

0.256

0.265

0.260

0.199a

County no. of beds per
1,000 persons age 651

26.308

24.363a

26.542

County no. of home
health agencies per
1,000 persons age 651

0.254

0.208a

0.261

0.226a

County under age 65
share of the population

0.865

0.863

0.865

0.869a

County female share
of the population

0.508

0.511a

0.508

0.509a

County African American
share of the population

0.115

0.139a

0.111

0.128a

County Hispanic share of
the population

0.110

0.100a

0.113

0.097a

County pop. share with
income < 100% FPL

0.131

0.139a

0.130

0.133

12.006

9.774a

12.615

7.365a

County Medicare
Advantage penetration rate
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TABLE 2. Continued
Facilities with Facilities with Facilities with
large payment small payment large payment
All facilities
decreases
changes
increases
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
County employment-topopulation ratio

1.404

1.237a

3.887

2.988a

3.973

4.193

[3.975]

[3.340]

[4.010]

[4.260]

12,712

1,285

10,650

777

1.423

1.416

Additional quality variables
Number of life safety
deﬁciencies

Number of health
deﬁciencies

Mean share of high-risk
long-stay residents with
pressure ulcers (QM 303)

Mean share of low-risk
long-stay residents with
pressure ulcers (QM 304)

Mean share of short-stay
residents with pressure
ulcers (QM 314)

Mean share of long-stay
residents who are physically
restrained (QM 311)

6.745

6.454

6.690

7.985a

[5.637]

[5.350]

[5.590]

[6.490]

12,712

1,285

10,650

13.54

14.46a

13.32

14.93a

[6.30]

[6.39]

[6.25]

[6.55]

9,474

1,017

7,896

561

2.59

2.41b

2.59

2.82c

[2.36]

[2.18]

[2.37]

[2.56]

7,204

820

5,940

444

18.46

19.81a

18.25

18.99b

[8.24]

[8.38]

[8.27]

[7.28]

9,330

1,000

7,781

549

6.93

6.77

6.88

7.83a

[7.36]

[6.97]

[7.40]

[7.63]

11,985

1,224

10,036

725

777

Note: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), and sample sizes are reported. Samples exclude
government-owned and in-hospital nursing facilities and facilities with missing data for RN
HPRD or the explanatory variables in the regressions. Superscript letters in columns 2 and 4 report whether the mean in each column is signiﬁcantly different from the mean in column 3.
a
indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the 10% level. Large payment increases (decreases) are deﬁned as increases (decreases) of 1% or more. Small payment changes are
deﬁned as those greater than 21% and less than 1%.
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TABLE 3. Effects of payment changes on stafﬁng, main speciﬁcation
RN HPRD
(1)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share

5.665a
(1.713)

LPN HPRD
(2)
5.023a
(1.886)

DC HPRD
(3)
5.278
(5.388)

DPayment # Post

20.816a
(0.303)

(0.353)

(0.929)

Post # Medicare Share

20.293a

20.331a

20.245b

(0.073)

(0.081)

(0.110)

No. of certiﬁed beds (facility)

20.001a

20.002a

20.004a

Chain (facility)

20.008c

(0.000)

Nonproﬁt (facility)

Beds/1,000 age 651 (county)

Share < age 65 (county)

(0.001)
20.028c

(0.010)

(0.016)

0.002

0.011

0.027

(0.013)

(0.026)

(0.027)

0.000

0.000

0.000

20.026

(0.000)
20.059

(0.001)
20.064c

(0.029)

(0.057)

(0.037)

0.220

0.313

21.810c

(0.482)
Share female (county)

(0.001)
20.008

20.442

(0.004)

(0.000)
HH/1,000 age 651 (county)

20.238

0.157

(0.708)
20.699

(1.081)
20.464

(0.527)

(0.881)

Share Afr. Amer. (county)

20.764b

0.088

(0.308)

(0.864)

(1.400)

Share Hispanic (county)

20.539

0.181

1.614

Poverty share (county)

20.081

MA penetration rate (county)

20.001c

(0.342)

(0.129)

Emp.-pop. ratio (county)

(0.434)
20.231
(0.220)
20.001

(1.575)
22.021

(1.149)
-0.008
(0.370)
20.003b

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.011

0.002

0.023

(0.023)

(0.042)

(0.086)

Dependent mean

0.314

0.775

3.252

% change in HPRD for a 5% increase
in the Medicare payment rate

9.01

3.24

0.81
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TABLE 3. Continued
RN HPRD
(1)

LPN HPRD
(2)

DC HPRD
(3)

Number of facilities

13,203

13,203

13,202

Number of observations

76,862

76,835

76,696

Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 5. For covariates, each cell reports
the coefﬁcient estimate and the robust standard error of the estimate clustered by unique MSACBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also include facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, stateby-year ﬁxed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the county’s
urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certiﬁed beds.
The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in the Medicare payment
rate, which is deﬁned as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with a Medicare share of 10%
relative to 0%. aindicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the 10% level.

from the geographic realignment. Online Appendix Figure A1; examines this in more detail by plotting mean RN, LPN, and DC HPRD over time and by quartiles in Medicare
share. The differential trends shown in the ﬁgure are consistent with the regression results.
For example, average RN and DC HRPD increased over time for facilities in quartiles 1
through 3 of the Medicare share distribution, but fell for facilities in the top quartile of
Medicare share. For LPN HPRD, average hours rose for facilities in all quartiles, but rose
to a lesser extent for facilities in the top quartile of the Medicare share distribution. The
large coefﬁcient estimates for the POST#Medicare share interaction are not a threat to
identiﬁcation, since our identifying variation comes from plausibly exogenous geographybased payment changes, rather than Medicare intensity alone.
Because stafﬁng is measured in terms of hours per resident day, we check whether the
stafﬁng results in Table 3 are simply driven by changes in resident days. That is, if payment
increases had reduced volume, this would have mechanically increased hours per resident
day. Although such an effect is counter to the traditional supply-side response of proﬁtmaximizing ﬁrms, it could occur if facilities engage in demand inducement when Medicare
payments fall. As a check, we estimate equation 5 where the dependent variable is the log of
total resident days. Table 4 reports the results; the estimated coefﬁcient is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus, changes in resident days do not explain the observed changes in
stafﬁng hours per resident day.
B . E V E N T ST UD Y S P EC I F I CA T I O N S

We next report the results from an event study speciﬁcation in which we allow the effect
of the payment change interacted with Medicare share to vary by year. This allows us to
test the key identifying assumption in our models, which is that in the absence of the
HWI-induced payment changes, the unobserved differences in stafﬁng between facilities
that experienced payment changes and those that did not would be the same over time,
among high Medicare share facilities relative to low share ones. For this speciﬁcation, we
replace the interaction term DPayment i # POST t # Medicare Sharei in equation 5 with
a series of interaction terms between a dummy variable for each year of our sample and
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TABLE 4. Effect of payment changes on resident days
Log (total resident days)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share

20.636
(1.029)

Number of facilities

12,403

Number of observations

66,893

Note: The table reports the results from estimating a variation of equation 5 in which the dependent variable is the log of total resident days, instead of a measure of stafﬁng. For brevity we report only the key coefﬁcient estimate from the model and its robust standard error clustered by
unique MSA-CBSA pairings (in parentheses). The model also includes the full list of covariates
reported in Table 3, plus facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, state-by-year ﬁxed effects, and a
set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certiﬁed beds.

DPayment i # Medicare Sharei . We omit the interaction term for 2005, the year before the
geographic change, as the base year. We also include the 2006 data and allow the model to
test directly for differential effects across the transition year and other post-change years.
We plot the estimated interaction term coefﬁcients from these speciﬁcations in Figure 4, and the results are supportive of the causal effects we report in Table 3. We test
for support of the parallel trend assumption by looking at the coefﬁcient estimates for
the interaction of DPayment and Medicare Share in the pre-period. The small point estimates for 2004 and 2005 suggest that there were not signiﬁcant differential stafﬁng pretrends between positive Medicare share facilities experiencing payment changes and zero
Medicare share facilities experiencing payment changes. Further, increases in Medicare
payment interacted with Medicare share had signiﬁcant positive effects on RN and LPN
hours per resident day in the post period ( p < 0:10).
C . RO B US TN E S S T E ST S

As noted above, the geographic change we study affected Medicare payments to hospitals
too, because the HWI is also used to adjust hospital payments up or down by differences in
labor costs across areas. Although the results from Shin (2019) showed no evidence that
hospital admissions, length of stay, or readmissions were affected by the HWI change,
we might be concerned that the payment change led to some other change in hospital behavior that could have implications for post-acute care in SNFs, and thus for facility staffing levels. To address this concern, we constructed a measure of the average hospital HWI
change between 2004 and 2008 across hospitals located in each SNF’s hospital service area
and controlled for that measure. Speciﬁcally, we added two interaction terms to our explanatory variables in equation 5: (1) the change in the area average hospital HWI multiplied by POST and Medicare share, and (2) the change in the area average hospital HWI
multiplied by POST.18 The results are reported in Table 5. The coefﬁcients on the additional
18 We use CMS Hospital Impact Files to construct this measure. For each hospital, the change in HWI is
measured as the post-reclassiﬁcation HWI in 2008 minus the post-reclassiﬁcation HWI in 2004. We average
HWI changes for hospitals located in the same hospital service area (HSA), weighting by hospital beds, and
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interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant in any of three stafﬁng models, while the
coefﬁcients on our key explanatory variable, the facility-speciﬁc payment change interacted with POST and Medicare share, are largely unchanged. Here, the simulated effects
of a ﬁve percent payment increase (for 10 percent relative to 0 percent Medicare share facilities) are statistically signiﬁcant, implying 8.16 percent and 3.44 percent increases in RN
HPRD and LPN HPRD, respectively.
Our main estimates are also robust to other changes in the controls (results available
upon request). Compared with the results shown in Table 3, the effect sizes are somewhat
larger when we exclude all time-varying facility controls (nonproﬁt ownership, being part
of a chain, number of beds) from the models. Here, simulated effects of a 5 percent payment increase (for 10 percent relative to 0 percent Medicare share facilities) are a 9.4 percent rise in RN HPRD and a 3.54 percent rise in LPN HPRD (both statistically signiﬁcant).
Estimates change by very little when we add interaction terms between each of the year
indicator variables and a metro area indicator for the county, instead of county urban
share. We estimate slightly smaller effect sizes when we exclude state-by-year dummy variables from the set of controls, given concerns of overﬁtting the model by including the
large set of state-by-year dummies. Here, simulated effects of a 5 percent payment increase
(for 10 percent relative to 0 percent Medicare share facilities) are an 8.78 percent rise in RN
HPRD and a 3.06 percent rise in LPN HPRD (both statistically signiﬁcant).
Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits differences in facility exposure to Medicare share in
the period prior to the payment change; this approach may produce biased estimates if facilities with higher Medicare shares make stafﬁng adjustments differently from facilities
with lower Medicare share. For example, some high Medicare share facilities may specialize in rehabilitation services and as a result may have different stafﬁng needs. We address
this concern in three ways. First, our main analysis deals with this indirectly by excluding
in-hospital SNFs from the estimation sample because those SNFs treat a disproportionately large share of Medicare patients. The mean Medicare share in in-hospital SNFs is
32.3 percent, more than twice as large as our sample average of 14.5 percent; for one-quarter
of in-hospital SNFs, the Medicare share is 80 percent or more, compared with only 0.5 percent of SNFs in our sample.19
Second, we estimate our main speciﬁcation (equation 5) using a sample that excludes
facilities with Medicare shares greater than or equal to 70 percent. The results are reported
in Table 6, and are very similar to the main sample results. The bottom row shows that
the same large simulated payment increase led RN hours per resident day to increase by
7.02 percent and LPN hours per resident day to increase by 4.02 percent, compared with
9.01 percent and 3.24 percent (respectively) in the full sample.
merge the average changes to each nursing facility in our sample by the facility HSA. The HSA is a unit of
geography used in the Dartmouth Atlas Project. It reﬂects local markets for hospital care. We use the 2008
post-reclassiﬁcation HWI since a large share of hospitals petition or receive adjustments to their HWI values
between 2004 and 2007. We note that for a number of SNFs in our data set, we were unable to construct this
measure because of missing data in the Impact Files. SNFs to which we were unable to assign a hospital HWI
change are located predominantly in small areas, which is consistent with the fact that Critical Access Hospitals are exempted from PPS payment.
19 Descriptive statistics pertain to the sample of SNFs in 2005.
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FIGURE 4. Effects of payment changes on nurse HPRD by year. The points
plotted in the ﬁgures are the estimated coefﬁcients of the interaction of
DPayment # Medicare Share with individual year dummy variables for each
year in our sample. We omit an interaction term for 2005, the year prior to the
payment change. The brackets show the 90% conﬁdence interval for the point
estimate. The dashed drop lines indicate the start and end of the transitional
year before the CBSA-based HWI was fully implemented. A: Dependent variable
is RN HPRD. B: Dependent variable is LPN HPRD. C: Dependent variable is DC
HPRD. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.
432

The Effects of Medicare Payment Changes on Nursing Home Stafﬁng // H E

ET AL.

TABLE 5. Effects of facility payment changes on stafﬁng, controlling for area
average hospital payment changes
RN HPRD
(1)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share

D Area Hospital HWI # Post # Medicare Share

5.422b

4.905

(2.006)

(2.150)

(5.899)

0.549

0.369

(0.380)
0.271
(0.198)

% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate
N

DC HPRD
(3)

5.206a
20.610

D Area Hospital HWI # Post

LPN HPRD
(2)

(0.441)
20.357
(0.221)

(1.471)
20.362
(0.730)

8.16

3.44

0.75

66,203

66,175

66,055

Note: The table reports the results from estimating a variation of equation 5 in which two additional controls are added: the interaction of the change in the area average hospital wage index
with POST and the triple interaction of the change in the area average hospital wage index, POST,
and Medicare share. We report coefﬁcient estimates from the model and the robust standard
errors of the estimates clustered by unique MSA-CBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also
include the full list of covariates reported in Table 3, plus facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects,
state-by-year ﬁxed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the
county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certiﬁed beds. The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in the Medicare
payment rate, which is deﬁned as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with a Medicare
share of 10% relative to 0% aindicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the
10% level.

Third, we report the results from estimating equation 6 below for subgroups of facilities
with similar Medicare shares:
yit 5 g DPayment i # POST t 1 b1 Xit 1 gi 1 tt 1 lst 1 εit

(6).

In this equation, identiﬁcation of payment changes comes from comparing changes in facility stafﬁng before and after the payment change across facilities with different size payment changes, and the estimated coefﬁcient on the double interaction term gives the effect
of the payment change. Note that this model does not rely on the variation in Medicare
share for identiﬁcation. Instead, we estimate this model for three subgroups of facilities
deﬁned by tercile in Medicare share. The results are reported in the ﬁrst three panels of
Table 7. For comparison, the fourth panel contains the full sample results; Online Appendix Table A1; reports the full model results for the full sample. Results from the RN HPRD
models lack the necessary precision to show a clear relationship, but they suggest that effects vary by Medicare share. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the simulated large payment increase
led to comparably sized 3.2 to 4.3 percent increases in LPN HPRD in facilities with high,
middle, and low shares of Medicare patients. The effects are statistically signiﬁcant for facilities in the middle and top terciles. We then estimate analogous event study speciﬁcations.
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TABLE 6. Effects of payment changes on stafﬁng, excluding SNFs
with Medicare share > 70%

DPayment # Post # Medicare Share

RN HPRD
(1)

LPN HPRD
(2)

DC HPRD
(3)

4.342b

6.195a

7.234

(1.920)

(2.164)

(6.373)

% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate

7.02

4.02

1.12

N

76,327

76,300

76,172

Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 5 on the sample of facilities with
Medicare share less than 70%. For brevity we report only the key coefﬁcient estimate from the
model and its robust standard error clustered by unique MSA-CBSA pairings (in parentheses).
All models also include the full list of covariates reported in Table 3, plus facility ﬁxed effects, year
ﬁxed effects, state-by-year ﬁxed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/
Medicaid certiﬁed beds. The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in
the Medicare payment rate, which is deﬁned as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with
a Medicare share of 10% relative to 0% aindicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level,
and cat the 10% level.

The results are reported in Online Appendix Figures A2–A5;. While the conﬁdence intervals
are large in these speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd little evidence of differential stafﬁng trends by Medicare payment change prior to 2005. Online Appendix Figures A2B and A3B; show that payment increases raised LPN HPRD in high and medium Medicare share facilities. The increase appears to remain throughout our sample period (through 2009) in high Medicare
share facilities but dissipates beginning in 2008 for medium Medicare share facilities. One
drawback of this alternative identiﬁcation strategy is that the policy variation is exclusively
location based and does not use the variation resulting from the differential exposure across
facilities.
D. ADDITIO N AL ANA L YSIS

As shown in Table 1, the geographic realignment led to payment increases and decreases of
varying sizes. In this section, we examine whether stafﬁng responses varied by the direction
and size of the payment change. We test for asymmetric and nonlinear responses to payment changes by estimating equation 7:
yit 5 a1 Large Increasei # POST t # Medicare Sharei 1 a2 Small Increasei # POST i
#Medicare Sharei 1 a3 Small Decreasei # POST t # Medicare Sharei
1a4 Large Decreasei # POST t # Medicare Sharei 1 a5 Large Increasei

(7).
ð7Þ.

#POST t 1 a6 Small Increasei # POST t 1 a7 Small Decreasei # POST t
1 a8 Large Decreasei #POST t 1 a9 POST t #Medicare Sharei 1 b1 Xit 1 gi 1 tt 1 lst 1 εit
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TABLE 7. Effects of payment changes on stafﬁng, double interaction
speciﬁcation results by Medicare share
RN HPRD
(1)

LPN HPRD
(2)

DC HPRD
(3)

0.244

0.742b

0.439

(0.290)

(0.304)

(0.567)

3.22

4.28

0.63

25,823

25,797

25,716

0.085

0.518c

0.571

(0.260)

(0.276)

(0.807)

1.52

3.39

0.90

26,065

26,059

26,036

0.449

20.184

A. SNFs in top tercile of Medicare share
DPayment # Post
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate
N
B. SNFs in middle tercile of Medicare share
DPayment # Post
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate
N
C. SNFs in bottom tercile of Medicare share
DPayment # Post

20.278
(0.235)

% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate
N

24.91

(0.365)
3.23

(0.577)
20.29

24,974

24,979

24,944

0.090

0.565a

0.402

(0.193)

(0.198)

(0.379)

1.43

3.64

0.62

76,862

76,835

76,696

D. Double interaction speciﬁcation: Full sample
DPayment # Post
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate
N

Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 6. For covariates, each cell reports
the coefﬁcient estimate and the robust standard error of the estimate clustered by unique MSACBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also include facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects,
state-by-year ﬁxed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the
county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certiﬁed beds. The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in the Medicare
payment rate, which is deﬁned as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with a Medicare
share of 10% relative to 0%. aindicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the
10% level.
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This speciﬁcation replaces the continuous measure of payment change from equation 5
with a set of four indicator variables for whether the facility experienced a large payment
increase, small payment increase, small payment decrease, or large payment decrease, with
zero change being the omitted category. We deﬁne large payment changes as those that are
greater than or equal to 1 percent in absolute value, and small changes as less than 1 percent in absolute value. The results are reported in Table 8. The signs of the estimated coefﬁcients suggest that payment increases usually raise stafﬁng while payment decreases
usually reduce stafﬁng, and there is evidence that both large and small payment changes
matter. In the RN models, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
of the payment increase term is equal to that of the payment decrease term, for both small
and large decreases. Thus the effect seems to be symmetric for payment increases and decreases. However, for LPN and DC models, the evidence is mixed. This exercise may underscore the limited statistical power of our analysis when we cut the data too thinly.
Finally, we examine whether Medicare payment increases are associated with changes
in other measures of quality. To examine this, we estimate equation 5 using several annual

TABLE 8. Tests for nonlinear asymmetric effects of payment changes
on stafﬁng
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1)
(2)
(3)
Large (1%1) payment increases # Post # Medicare Share
Small (0%–1%) payment increases # Post # Medicare Share
Small (0%–1%) payment decreases # Post # Medicare Share

0.339a

0.502a

0.217

(0.102)

(0.161)

(0.338)

0.281c

0.133

(0.168)

(0.203)

20.366

c

(0.199)
Large (1%1) payment decreases # Post # Medicare Share

20.057

20.305
(0.222)
0.110

20.339
(0.260)
20.538c
(0.290)
20.498

(0.171)

(0.160)

(0.328)

p-value from the hypothesis test that large increases and
decreases have an equal-sized effect

0.238

0.037

0.579

p-value from the hypothesis test that small increases and
decreases have the same effect

0.770

0.629

0.039

Number of facilities

13,203

13,203

13,202

Number of observations

76,862

76,835

76,696

Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation 7. For covariates, each cell reports
the coefﬁcient estimate and the robust standard error of the estimate clustered by unique MSACBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also include the interactions of large/small payment
increases/decreases with POST, the interaction of POST and Medicare share, plus the timevarying facility and county traits shown in Table 3 and facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, and
state-by-year ﬁxed effects. aindicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the
10% level.
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75,749

75,749

13,173
56,815

10,957

(0.720)

20.201

(7.515)

23.113

(40.633)

27.981

39,783

9,037

(0.376)

21.522

55,416

10,899

(0.802)

2.608

a

a

71,196

12,692

(0.672)

21.489b

(5.895)

21.607

21.154
(6.875)

(32.533)

37.614

Share of long-stay
residents who are
physically restrained
(QM 311)
(6)

(24.226)

11.713

Share of short-stay
residents with
pressure ulcers
(QM 314)
(5)

(2.256)

24.921b

(13.782)

21.048

Share of high-risk long- Share of low-risk longstay residents with
stay residents with
pressure ulcers
pressure ulcers
(QM 303)
(QM 304)
(3)
(4)

Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 5, in which the dependent variable is an alternate measure of facility quality, as indicated in the column heading. For brevity we report only the key coefﬁcient estimates from the model and robust standard errors of the estimates clustered by unique MSA-CBSA
pairings (in parentheses). All models also include the full list of covariates reported in Table 3, plus facility ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, state-by-year ﬁxed effects,
and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid
certiﬁed beds. aindicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the 10% level.

13,173

(0.586)

(0.285)

Number of observations

20.108

(6.062)

(4.162)

0.148

24.183

21.098

3.419
(18.413)

(11.342)

Number
of health
deﬁciencies
(2)

28.493

Number of facilities

Post # Medicare Share

DPayment # Post

DPayment # Post #
Medicare Share

Number of
life safety
deﬁciencies
(1)

TABLE 9. Effects of payment changes on other measures of quality
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facility-level measures of quality as dependent variables in separate regressions. Speciﬁcally,
we model the number of life safety deﬁciencies, the number of health deﬁciencies, the percentage of residents with pressure ulcers (among high- and low-risk long-stay residents
and short-stay residents), and the percentage of long-stay residents who are physically restrained. The results are reported in Table 9. The coefﬁcient estimates for the main explanatory variable, the triple interaction between change in payment, baseline Medicare share,
and the POST indicator, are not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the models. Admittedly,
measures like life safety deﬁciencies are based on characteristics of the facility’s physical
plant, which may be slow to change. Further, only one of these additional measures is speciﬁc to short-stay residents, so we have limited ability to test whether Medicare payment
increases translated to quality improvements speciﬁc to Medicare patients.20

VIII. Conclusions
We use a novel strategy to identify the causal effects of facility-speciﬁc Medicare payment
changes on nursing home stafﬁng. We ﬁnd that increases in Medicare payments led facilities to increase nursing staff hours per resident day. Speciﬁcally, RN and LPN hours per
resident day increased by 9.01 percent and 3.24 percent respectively in response to a 5 percent rise in Medicare payment, for facilities with 10 percent of resident days paid by Medicare relative to those with zero Medicare patients. Our results are robust to various speciﬁcation changes, including a ﬂexible event study speciﬁcation that provides support for
our identifying assumption of parallel trends in the pre-period data. The increases in staffing hours per resident day do not arise mechanically from decreases in resident days.
To put our estimates’ magnitudes in context, consider the following back-of-the-envelope
calculation that connects a hypothetical Medicare payment increase to nurse payroll spending. For this exercise, we consider a 5 percent increase in the Medicare per diem payment
rate; given that the average Medicare per diem in our sample in 2005 was $262, this amounts
to an increase of $13.10. Further, we used the Current Population Surveys during our sample period to calculate the mean hourly wages of RNs and LPNs working at nursing homes;
these costs are $22 and $17, respectively. Our main coefﬁcient estimates in Table 3 imply average effects on RN and LPN hours per resident day of 0.028 (5:665 # 0:05 # ½0:1 2 0:0)
and 0.025 (5:023 # 0:05 # ½0:1 2 0:0), respectively, at facilities with 10 percent Medicare
share relative to facilities with zero Medicare share. Multiplying by average wages per hour,
those effect estimates imply increased spending on RNs and LPNs of $0.62 and $0.43 per resident day, respectively. Taking RNs and LPNs together, a SNF with 10 percent Medicare
share would spend $1.05 more on stafﬁng out of the $13.10 reimbursement increase relative
to a SNF with zero Medicare share. This suggests that 8 percent of the payment increase is
transferred directly to spending on patient care through stafﬁng. Note that our measure of
20 In a robustness check, we also estimated models in which each of the 11 other individual QMs (including two other short-stay measures) served as the dependent variable in a separate regression. In only one case
was the coefﬁcient of the main explanatory variable statistically signiﬁcant (the share of long-stay residents
feeling depressed or anxious), and the sign of the coefﬁcient was positive, which runs counter to expectations.
The results are available upon request.
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stafﬁng applies to the entire facility, not just nursing staff who deliver care to Medicare
patients.
Stafﬁng is a structural measure of quality; we also tested whether payment decreases
were associated with a range of measures that represent other measurable dimensions
of quality, including process and outcomes of care. We found little evidence that other
measures of quality improved as payments rose. In this way, our work is also similar to
other papers that have examined the impact of Medicare payment changes on nonstafﬁng
measures of quality. For example, prior studies on the effects of Medicare payment rates
on other dimensions of quality have also failed to identify signiﬁcant changes in facility
inspection deﬁciencies, pressure sores, and restraint use (Konetzka et al. 2004; White
2005). It remains possible that the stafﬁng changes we identiﬁed affected unmeasured
or unobservable quality dimensions (Werner, Konetzka, and Kruse 2009).
Our study has several limitations. First, although we have a strong identiﬁcation strategy, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the HWI shocks to facilities could be
endogenous. For example, the shocks are geographically related and could be incidentally
correlated with other local changes. We do, however, control for facility ﬁxed effects and
urban population share interacted with year dummy variables. In an alternative speciﬁcation we control for a facility’s metro status with year dummy variables, and our results are
very similar. Second, we examine a one-time policy shock that occurred in 2005, so one
may question the generalizability of our results to the current debate about Medicare payment reform and nursing home quality shortcomings. We acknowledge the lack of external validity, but we note the typical trade-off between external validity and internal validity. Third, our measures of stafﬁng are reported by facilities and prone to measurement
error (e.g., Castle 2008). Medicare has only recently begun to release the payroll data that
nursing homes are required to report under the ACA (Rau and Lucas 2018); as far as we
know, no other facility-level sources of administrative data on stafﬁng are available nationwide. Additionally, the stafﬁng measures we use, as well as some of the other quality measures reported in Table 9, are not speciﬁc to Medicare. It is possible that facility responses
to Medicare payment changes occur on payer-speciﬁc dimensions of quality. Fourth, the
studied shock to HWI for most facilities induces a somewhat small impact on Medicare
payment. We however note that those seemingly small price shocks may be quite important for the proﬁt margins of nursing homes, and could plausibly lead to important facility
responses. Finally, our analysis focuses on stafﬁng responses; another type of facility response to changes in ﬁnancial incentives is to engage in upcoding (e.g., Bowblis and Brunt
2014). Shin (2019) reports that hospitals engaged in upcoding in response to the same type
of payment shock we examine. Whether nursing facilities act similarly is a question for
future research.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for public policy. Future Medicare payment
policy recommendations should carefully consider the evidence that Medicare reimbursement cuts could lead to reduced stafﬁng levels. This is especially important in light of recommended and actual cuts to PPS payment rates. For example, MedPAC has recommended
freezing or reducing Medicare payments under the SNF PPS in each of the past 10 years, and
in 2010, the ACA authorized $200 billion in Medicare payment cuts over 10 years (MedPAC,
various years; Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2010). Such payment cuts can signiﬁcantly
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reduce health-care providers’ reimbursements; indeed, CMS estimates that the ACA
cuts will result in negative margins for half of all hospitals and two-thirds of skilled nursing facilities by 2040 (Hefﬂer et al. 2016). Our results suggest that such changes, and the
important changes under way as the new SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program imposes
ﬁnancial penalties on some facilities and rewards others, could have important and uneven
impacts on nursing home resident experiences.
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